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Abstract.	An	increasing	number	of	epistemologists	defend	the	notion	that	some	perceptual	
experiences	can	immediately	justify	some	beliefs	and	do	so	in	virtue	of	(some	of)	their	phenomenal	
properties.	But	this	view,	which	we	may	call	phenomenal	dogmatism,	is	also	the	target	of	various	
objections.	Here	I	want	to	consider	an	objection	that	may	be	put	as	follows:	What	is	so	special	
about	perceptual	phenomenology	that	only	it	can	immediately	justify	beliefs,	while	other	kinds	of	
phenomenology	–	including	quite	similar	ones	–	remain	‘epistemically	inert’?	I	will	argue	that	to	
overcome	this	objection,	the	phenomenal	dogmatist	should	incorporate	into	her	view	a	general	
principle	–	I	call	it	the	‘experiential	attitude/doxastic	content	link’	principle	–	that	essentially	
extends	the	view	from	the	perceptual	case	to	other	phenomenal	states.	
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Can	a	conscious	experience	justify	you	in	believing	something	purely	in	virtue	of	what	it	is	
like	for	you	to	have	that	experience?	Some	philosophers	think	so,	defending	what	I	will	call	
phenomenal	dogmatism:	
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(PD)		 For	some	experience	E	and	belief	B,	(i)	E	provides	immediate	prima	facie	
epistemic	justification	for	B	and	(ii)	E	does	so	in	virtue	of	(some	of)	E’s	
phenomenal	properties.	
Here	immediate	justification	for	a	belief	B	is	justification	that	is	independent	of	the	subject’s	
justification	for	any	of	her	other	beliefs;	prima	facie	justification	is	justification	that	can	be	
overturned	or	overridden	by	defeaters;	and	epistemic	justification	is	(very	roughly)	
justification	for	thinking	that	something	is	the	case	(i.e.,	for	taking	the	world	to	be	a	certain	
way).1		
Something	like	PD	is	defended	by	Pryor	(2000),	Huemer	(2001),	and	following	them	
many	others.	But	PD	is	also	the	target	of	various	criticisms.	Some	come	from	Bayesian	
probability	theory,	some	from	the	psychology	of	cognitive	penetration,	some	from	broadly	
Sellarsian	reflections	on	what	it	takes	to	justify,	and	some	from	other	sources.	Here	I	want	
to	consider	an	objection	that	may	be	put	as	follows:	What	is	so	special	about	perceptual	
phenomenology	that	only	it	can	immediately	justify	beliefs,	while	other	kinds	of	
phenomenology	–	including	quite	similar	ones	–	remain	‘epistemically	inert’?	This	objection	
has	been	aired	a	number	of	times	in	the	recent	literature	(e.g.,	Ghijsen	2014,	Siegel	and	
Silins	2015,	Teng	2018).	The	reason	I	want	to	consider	it	is	not	that	I	think	it	is	specially	
formidable,	but	because	my	response	to	it	will	lead	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	
general	phenomenon	of	phenomenal	justification	–	the	very	idea	of	justification	in	virtue	of	
phenomenology.	
																																																								
1	Moreover,	we	have	in	mind	specifically	propositional	rather	than	doxastic	justification	–	
justification	that	one	has	for	believing	regardless	of	whether	one	in	fact	believes.	
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1.	Phenomenal	Dogmatism;	and	an	Initial	Challenge	
One	way	to	appreciate	PD	is	by	contrasting	the	doxastic	stances	it	is	epistemically	rational	
for	someone	to	take	when	they	experience	a	certain	phenomenology	versus	when	they	do	
not.	Consider	this	vignette:	
(Dark	Room)	You	wake	up	from	a	groggy	nap	and	find	yourself	in	a	pitch-dark	room	that	
feels	unfamiliar.	A	warm	voice	startles	you	with	a	question:	do	you	(a)	believe	that	there	
is	a	chair	in	the	room,	(b)	disbelieve	that	there	is	a	chair	in	the	room,	or	(c)	suspend	
judgment	about	whether	there	is	one.	After	you	answer,	the	lights	come	on,	and	you	
have	a	vivid	perceptual	experience	as	of	a	chair	right	in	front	of	you.	The	voice	comes	on	
again	and	asks	whether	now	you	(a)	believe,	(b)	disbelieve,	or	(c)	suspend	judgment	
about	there	being	a	chair	in	the	room.	
Intuitively,	the	doxastic	attitude	it	is	most	rational	for	you	to	take	the	first	time	around	is	to	
suspend	judgment;	but	once	the	lights	come	on,	it	is	more	rational	for	you	to	believe.2	
Choosing	to	believe	while	lying	in	unfamiliar	pitch	dark	seems	like	epistemic	irrational	
exuberance,	but	choosing	to	suspend	judgment	when	experiencing	a	chair	lying	right	there	
before	your	wide-open	eyes	seems	like	perverse	cautiousness	(McGrath	2013).			
																																																								
2	If	spaces	one	woke	up	in	unexpectedly	were	widely	known	to	feature	chairs,	then	background	
beliefs	would	make	it	rational	for	you	to	believe	even	in	the	darkness.	But	a	more	elaborate	thought	
experiment	could	certainly	make	sure	that	the	proposition	up	for	belief,	disbelief,	or	judgment-
suspension	is	one	that	obtains	50%	of	the	time.	Background	beliefs	then	would	make	no	difference.	
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What	explains	the	change	in	which	stance	is	rational?	A	natural	explanation	is	that	
first	you	experienced	no	chair	phenomenology	and	then	you	did.	One	alternative	
explanation	might	be	that	once	the	lights	came	on,	a	mechanism	of	visual	chair-detection,	
reliable	in	well-lit	rooms,	produced	a	certain	perceptual	state	in	you.	It	is	not	because	of	the	
phenomenology	of	this	perceptual	state,	but	because	of	its	etiology,	that	it	is	now	rational	for	
you	to	believe	that	there	is	a	chair	in	the	room.	Phenomenal	dogmatists	resist	this	
alternative	explanation,	roughly	on	the	following	grounds	(Smithies	2014).	The	intuition	
about	a	change	in	which	attitude	is	rational	does	not	disappear	when	we	run	Dark	Room	
with	an	envatted	phenomenal	duplicate	of	you;	yet	your	duplicate’s	chair-detection	
mechanism	is	entirely	unreliable	(failing	as	it	does	to	lead	to	a	preponderance	of	true	
beliefs).		
Suppose,	though,	that	between	the	two	appearances	of	the	warm	voice,	the	lights	do	
not	come	on,	and	consequently	you	have	no	perceptual	experience	as	of	a	chair;	but	as	it	
happens,	you	are	visited	by	an	extraordinarily	vivid	imaginative	experience	as	of	a	chair	
before	you.	Intuitively,	this	would	not	justify	a	change	in	doxastic	stance:	after	undergoing	
this	imaginative	experience,	it	is	still	most	rational	for	you	to	suspend	judgment	on	whether	
there	is	a	chair	before	you.	Thus	having	a	vivid	chair	phenomenology	is	not	sufficient	to	
justify	belief.	Perhaps	with	the	aid	of	an	accompanying	(justified)	belief	to	the	effect	that	
your	experience	is	perceptual	rather	than	imaginative,	your	chairy	phenomenology	can	
justify	believing	that	there	is	a	chair	before	you.	But	the	need	for	such	a	supporting	belief	
would	mean	that	the	justification	is	no	longer	immediate,	so	it	is	not	purely	in	virtue	of	your	
chair	phenomenology	that	your	chair	belief	would	be	justified.		
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The	phenomenal	dogmatist	has	two	options	here.	One	is	to	reject	the	intuition	that	
an	imaginative	experience	could	never	immediately	justify	a	perceptual	belief.	Perhaps	
some	imaginative	experiences	do	justify	perceptual	beliefs,	notably	if	they	have	the	same	
phenomenology	as	perceptual	experiences	or	are	mistaken	for	perceptual	experiences	
(introspection	is	not	infallible,	after	all!).	If	so,	the	phenomenal	similarity	of	imaginative	and	
perceptual	experiences	poses	no	problem	to	the	notion	that	experiences	can	immediately	
justify	purely	in	virtue	of	their	phenomenology.		
The	other	option	is	to	say	that	imaginative	experiences	as	of	chairs	never	really	have	
the	very	same	phenomenology	that	perceptual	experiences	of	chairs	do:	there	are	subtle	but	
systematic	phenomenal	differences	between	perception	and	imagination,	and	something	
about	the	distinctive	phenomenology	of	perceptual	experience	uniquely	poises	it	to	justify	
perceptual	beliefs.		
As	we	will	see	in	§2,	both	Pryor	and	Huemer	opt	for	the	second	option.	Bracketing	
the	issue	of	the	ultimate	plausibility	of	the	two	options,	I	will	follow	Pryor	and	Huemer	in	
exploring	the	possibility	of	systematic	phenomenal	differences	between	perception	and	
imagination.	Again	I	do	so	mainly	because	it	is	this	response	that	would	lead	us,	I	want	to	
show,	to	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	very	phenomenon	of	phenomenal	justification.		
Importantly,	there	are	two	quite	different	versions	of	the	idea	that	imaginative	and	
perceptual	experiences	have	systematically	different	phenomenologies;	we	may	put	them	
informally	as	follows:	
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(R1)	The	chairy	quality	of	imaginative	chair	phenomenology	can	never	match	the	chairy	
quality	of	perceptual	chair	phenomenology;	concentrate	as	hard	as	you	might,	you	
cannot	conjure	up	an	image	of	a	chair	quite	as	vivid,	acute,	and	detailed	as	any	
average	perceptual	experience	of	a	chair.	
(R2)	In	addition	to	its	chairy	quality,	a	perceptual	chair	experience	also	has	a	subtle	
quality	of	perceptuality,	and	it	is	this	that	distinguishes	it	from	imaginative	chair	
experiences,	which	have	rather	a	quality	of	imaginativeness.		
R1	is	in	many	respects	the	simpler	option,	but	in	fact	both	Pryor	and	Huemer	go	for	R2.	We	
will	discuss	their	views	in	more	detail	in	§2.	But	first	it	might	be	useful	to	consider	some	of	
the	limitations	of	R1	that	motivate	pursuing	R2.		
First,	even	if	an	imaginative	experience	of	a	chair	as	vivid,	acute,	and	detailed	as	a	
perceptual	experience	were	not	psychologically	in	the	cards	for	us,	it	still	seems	
metaphysically	possible	for	such	an	experience	to	occur	(to	some	sentient	creature),	and	this	
is	all	the	imagination	objection	appears	to	require.	Secondly,	a	perfect	match	seems	in	fact	
nomologically	possible.	Visualize	if	you	will	a	drawing	of	a	chair.	It	should	be	possible	for	an	
unwitting	illustrator	to	draw	a	chair	such	that	seeing	that	drawing	under	the	right	
circumstances	would	reproduce	perfectly	the	phenomenology	of	your	visualization	(Byrne	
2010:	17).	Thirdly,	actual	cases	of	this	sort	are	in	fact	common	–	they	just	tend	to	occur	
outside	visual	perception.	Try	to	imagine	a	particularly	wonderful	smell	of	freshly	brewed	
coffee.	The	coffee-ish	quality	of	the	olfactory	image	you	just	conjured	up	may	well	match	for	
vivacity,	detail,	and	acuteness	the	quality	of	my	current	olfactory	perception	as	I	appear	to	
sniff	in	the	distance	an	underwhelming	cup	of	coffee.		
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Relatedly,	the	notions	of	a	vivid,	acute,	and	detailed	phenomenology	are	in	truth	far	
from	straightforward.	Suppose	Sam,	sitting	in	Singapore,	imagines	a	deafeningly	loud	
explosion	right	in	the	middle	of	her	office;	while	Sasha,	dining	in	Shanghai,	hears	a	dim	
faraway	explosion-ish	sound.	Which	sound	experience	is	more	‘vivid,	acute,	and	detailed’	
(cf.	Sartre	1936:	84)?	It	depends	of	course	on	what	all	these	words	mean;	the	point	is	that	
the	phenomenal	dogmatist	cannot	simply	brandish	those	terms	and	consider	the	challenge	
from	imagination	neutralized.	As	soon	as	we	step	outside	the	visual	domain	(and	perhaps	
the	tactile	as	well),	the	phenomenal	characteristics	vaguely	intimated	by	these	terms	are	
much	more	commonly	shared	across	perceptual	and	imaginative	experiences.	Yet	it	would	
be	very	strange	for	a	phenomenal	dogmatist	to	claim	that	visual	and	tactile	perceptions	
(say)	provide	immediate	justification	while	auditory,	olfactory,	and	gustatory	perceptions	
do	not.	
Perhaps	for	such	reasons,	Pryor	and	Huemer	pursue	R2	(see	§2).	Rather	than	claim	
that	the	chairy	quality	of		chair-perceptions	differs	from	that	of	chair-imaginings,	they	claim	
that	perceptual	chair	experiences	have	a	perception-ish	quality	that	differs	from	imaginative	
chair	experiences’	imagination-ish	quality.	The	challenge,	of	course,	is	to	explain	(a)	what	
these	perception-ish	and	imagination-ish	qualities	are	supposed	to	be,	and	(b)	how	the	
phenomenological	difference	between	them	is	supposed	to	ground	an	epistemic	difference.	
In	the	next	section,	we	attend	to	(a);	thereafter	we	will	turn	to	(b).	
	
2.	Perception,	Imagination,	and	the	Content/Attitude	Distinction	
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One	phenomenal	difference	between	perceiving	and	imagining	as	such	(i.e.,	independently	
of	the	content	perceived	or	imagined)	is	this:	perceiving	x	is	typically	will-resistant	whereas	
imagining	x	is	not.	Some	imaginings	comes	to	us	unbidden,	and	some	are	obsessive-
compulsive,	in	a	way	that	makes	them	at	least	partially	non-will-resistant;	and	some	
perceivings-as	are	more	agentive	and	willful	–	think	of	seeing	a	sheep	in	the	clouds	or	a	
rabbit	on	the	moon’s	surface.	Still,	the	correlation	between	the	perception/imagination	and	
will-resistant/non-will-resistant	distinctions	is	real	and	potentially	epistemically	
significant.	Yet	neither	Pryor	nor	Huemer	appeals	to	it	in	explaining	the	difference	in	
epistemic	oomph	between	perceiving	and	imagining.	We	will	return	to	why	toward	the	end	
of	this	section.		
According	to	Pryor	and	Huemer,	what	distinguishes	perceptual	from	imaginative	
experiences	is	the	former’s	phenomenal	‘force’	or	‘forcefulness’:	
[I]t’s	not	the	irresistibility	of	our	perceptual	beliefs	…	which	explains	why	our	[perceptual]	
experiences	give	us	the	immediate	justification	they	do.	Rather,	it’s	the	peculiar	
“phenomenal	force”	or	way	our	experiences	have	of	presenting	propositions	to	us.	Our	
experiences	represent	propositions	in	such	a	way	that	it	“feels	as	if”	we	could	tell	that	those	
propositions	are	true…	[T]his	“feeling”	is	part	of	what	distinguishes	the	attitude	of	
[perceptually]	experiencing	that	p	from	other	propositional	attitudes,	like	belief	and	visual	
imagination.	(Pryor	2000:	547	fn37)	
Even	if	you	have	a	very	vivid,	very	detailed	imagination,	or	you	have	very	poor	eyesight,	you	
still	would	never	confuse	seeing	a	tomato	with	imagining	one.	The	reason	lies	in	what	I	call	
the	“forcefulness”	of	perceptual	experiences:	perceptual	experiences	represent	their	
contents	as	actualized;	states	of	merely	imagining	do	not.	When	you	have	a	visual	experience	
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of	a	tomato,	it	thereby	seems	to	you	as	if	a	tomato	is	actually	present,	then	and	there.	When	
you	merely	imagine	a	tomato,	it	does	not	thereby	seem	to	you	as	if	a	tomato	is	actually	
present.	(Huemer	2001:	77)	
Pryor’s	notion	of	phenomenal	force	and	Huemer’s	notion	of	forcefulness	are	very	similar	
not	just	in	name	but	in	substance.	Both	take	the	relevant	feature	to	distinguish	the	
phenomenology	of	perceiving	from	that	of	imagining,	and	both	take	it	to	be	external	to	the	
content	of	experience:	it	is	not	a	matter	of	the	contents	perceived	or	imagined,	but	of	the	
very	‘attitude’	–	perceiving	vs.	imagining	–	taken	toward	those	contents.	There	is	a	way	
perceptual	experience	relates	representationally	to	its	content	that	is	different,	on	Pryor’s	
and	Huemer’s	views,	from	the	way	imaginative	experience	relates	representationally	to	its	
content.	And	this	difference	in	attitude	or	representational	relation	to	content	makes	a	
phenomenal	difference.		
Moreover,	both	take	the	experiential	attitude	characteristic	of	perception,	but	not	of	
imagination,	to	be	an	assertoric	attitude,	committing	to	the	world	being	a	certain	way,	
namely	the	way	specified	in	the	content.	When	you	have	a	perceptual	experience	of	a	blue	
chair,	your	experience	takes	a	stand	on	how	the	world	really	is:	it	‘tells	you’	that	the	world	
contains	a	blue	chair	right	there.	This	is	different	from	the	experiential	attitude	involved	in	
imagination:	when	you	imagine	a	blue	chair,	the	imaginative	experience	does	not	‘tell	you’	
to	take	the	world	to	be	the	way	the	experience’s	content	specifies.	
In	this	respect	perceiving	differs	from	imagining	somewhat	as	believing	that	p	differs	
from	wondering	whether	p.	The	content	in	both	latter	cases	is	<p>,	but	when	the	attitude	
we	take	toward	<p>	is	the	belief	attitude,	we	commit	ourselves	to	the	world	really	being	
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such	that	p;	whereas	when	the	attitude	we	take	toward	<p>	is	that	of	wondering,	we	do	not.	
This	is,	presumably,	because	of	the	nature	of	the	attitudes	taken.	The	belief	attitude	in	some	
sense	frames	p	as	being	the	case;	the	wondering	attitude	does	not.	Similarly,	a	perceptual	
experience,	in	Pryor’s	and	Huemer’s	conception,	frames	the	subject’s	surroundings	as	really	
being	the	way	the	experience’s	content	specifies.	An	imaginative	experience	as	of	a	
qualitatively	indistinguishable	scene	is	unlike	that	–	it	does	not	frame	the	imagined	scene	as	
characterizing	the	way	the	subject’s	surroundings	really	are.		
How	does	an	imaginative	experience	frame	its	content?	According	to	Yablo	(1993),	
imagining	a	blue	chair	frames	a	blue	chair	as	possible.	Sartre	(1940:	183)	thought	it	frames	
the	blue	chair	as	absent	or	‘not	there.’	Other	views	are	possible	as	well.	What	matters	for	
our	purposes	is	just	this:	even	if	a	perceptual	and	an	imaginative	experience	of	a	blue	chair	
had	the	exact	same	content,	their	overall	phenomenology	would	still	be	different	due	to	
employing	different	experiential	attitudes	toward	that	content.		
	 One	important	difference	between	Pryor’s	and	Huemer’s	views,	at	least	as	presented	
in	the	passages	quoted	above,	is	that	Pryor	speaks	of	an	attitude	that	tells	us	to	take	the	
content	as	true,	whereas	Huemer	speaks	of	an	attitude	that	tells	us	to	take	the	content	‘as	
actualized’	or	‘as	actually	present	then	and	there.’	I	will	work	here	with	Huemer’s	
characterization,	for	the	following	reason.	Speaking	of	presenting	the	content	‘as	true’	
implies	that	perceptual	content	is	the	kind	of	thing	that	can	be	true	or	false,	which	suggests	
a	propositional	conception	of	perceptual	content.	To	my	mind,	however,	there	is	no	need	for	
phenomenal	dogmatism	to	commit	to	perceptual	content	being	propositional,	objectual,	or	
sometimes	propositional	and	sometimes	objectual.	(On	objectual	attitudes,	see	Forbes	
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2000.)	A	paradigmatic	example	is	love:	what	proposition	p	might	be	such	that	loving	for	my	
son	would	amount	to	my	loving	that	p?)	Indeed,	to	me	it	seems	more	intuitive	that	
perceptual	experience	is	at	least	sometimes	objectual.	Ordinary	language	certainly	offers	us	
not	only	the	‘S	perceives	that	p’	construction,	but	also	‘S	perceives	x.’	And	intuitively,	when	
an	Albanian	shepherd	atop	a	scraggly	mountain	takes	in	the	sun	setting	over	the	Adriatic,	
his	many	goats	amiably	milling	about,	it	is	odd	to	say	that	what	is	thereby	present	to	his	
mind	is	a	proposition	–	even	if	what	is	present	to	his	mind	is	profitably	modeled	by	a	
proposition.	Now,	when	content	is	objectual	we	cannot	speak	of	it	being	true	or	false.	If	S	
has	an	experience	of	a	yellow	lemon,	it	seems	like	a	category	mistake	to	say	that	the	yellow	
lemon	is	true.	But	it	would	be	perfectly	legitimate	to	say	that	a	yellow	lemon	is	actually	
present	then	and	there.		
	 To	summarize	the	point:	because	I	find	it	more	natural	to	think	of	perceptual	
experience	as	being	(sometimes)	objectual	rather	than	propositional,	I	follow	Huemer	in	
taking	the	perceptual	attitude	to	frame	its	object	as	actual,	or	(better)	actually	present	here	
and	now.	To	capture	the	fact	that	this	actual-presence	is	a	dimension	of	perception’s	
attitude	rather	than	content,	I	will	say	that	a	perceptual	experience	of	a	blue	chair	does	not	
quite	present	a	blue-chair-as-actual,	but	rather	presents-as-actual	a	blue	chair;	or	that	it	
represents-as-actually-present-here-and-now	the	blue	chair,	rather	than	represents	a	blue-
chair-as-actually-present-here-and-now.3	These	descriptors	are	meant	to	characterize	the	
distinctive	manner	by	which	perception	relates	representationally	to	its	content,	somewhat	
as	truth	characterizes	the	specific	manner	belief	that	p	relates	representationally	to	<p>:	
																																																								
3	I	will	use	‘present’	and	‘represent’	interchangeably,	though	it	is	certainly	possible	to	leverage	their	
differing	connotations	to	do	some	substantive	work.	
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when	we	say	that	belief	that	p	frames	<p>	as	true,	we	do	not	mean	that	the	belief’s	content	
is	<p	is	true>;	no,	the	content	is	simply	<p>,	and	the	belief	represents-as-true	that	content.	
Similarly,	a	perceptual	experience	of	a	yellow	lemon	represents-as-actually-present-here-
and-now	the	content	<yellow	lemon>.	
My	suggestion	is	that	this	representing-as-actual(ly-present-here-and-now)	is	what	
the	phenomenal	force(fulness)	of	perceptual	experiences	amounts	to.	Imaginative	
experiences	of	qualitatively	indistinguishable	scenes	lack	this	feature.	On	a	Yablovian	view,	
an	imaginative	experience	of	a	blue	chair	represent-as-possible	a	blue	chair.	Representing-
as-actual	and	representing-as-possible	are	two	different	manners	of	representing	the	same	
content.	On	a	Sartrean	view,	the	attitude	characteristic	of	imagining	is	rather	representing-
as-absent,	or	representing-as-absent-here-and-now,	which	contrasts	more	clearly	with	
representing-as-present-here-and-now.		
These	hyphenated	expressions	are	of	course	purely	technocratic.	The	point	is	just	
that	for	Pryor	and	Huemer,	even	when	the	content-based	phenomenal	features	of	
imaginative	and	perceptual	experiences	match	perfectly,	they	still	differ	phenomenally	in	
virtue	of	an	‘attitudinal’	difference	between	them:	the	quality	of	representing-as-actual,	or	
representing-as-actually-present-here-and-now,	constitutes	the	quality	of	perceptuality	
mentioned	at	the	end	of	§1;	while	representing-as-possible,	or	representing-as-absent-
here-and-now,	or	whatever	is	ultimately	the	right	attitudinal	characterization	here,	
constitutes	the	quality	of	imaginativeness.	
Setting	aside	the	specifics	of	Pryor’s	and	Huemer’s	accounts,	the	basic	idea	here	is	to	
distinguish	perceptual	from	imaginative	phenomenology	in	terms	of	these	experiences’	
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distinctive	attitudes,	not	the	contents	perceived/imagined.	Why	do	Pryor	and	Huemer	
prefer	this	kind	of	attitudinal	account	over	a	content	account?	Presumably,	because	they	
think	that	nothing	rules	out	the	very	same	content	being	perceived	by	S	and	imagined	by	S*	
–	for	all	the	reasons	cited	at	the	of	§1.	
But	why	prefer	an	attitudinal	account	over	an	account	in	terms	of	will-resistance	
(characteristic	of	perception	but	not	imagination)?4	Three	potential	reasons	may	be	cited.	
First,	as	noted	some	perceptions	involve	a	willful	element	(e.g.,	seeing	a	horse	in	the	clouds,	
seeing	a	figure	as	duck	rather	than	rabbit);	whereas	the	attitudinal	characterization	of	
perceptuality	is	supposed	to	capture	its	very	nature	–	what	makes	perceptual	experience	
the	mental	state	type	it	is	–	and	should	thus	be	exceptionless.	Secondly,	even	if	perceptual	
experience	were	always	will-resistant,	this	might	not	always	show	up	in	the	phenomenology:	
it	is	one	thing	for	perception	to	be	will-resistant,	another	for	it	to	feel	will-resistant.	Thirdly,	
any	phenomenal	difference	in	will-resistance	is	plausibly	explained	by	the	attitudinal	
differences	between	perception	and	imagination.	Compare:	you	can	(typically)	wonder	
whether	p	at	will,	but	not	believe	that	p	at	will,	but	this	seems	to	flow	from,	rather	than	
underlie,	the	difference	between	what	it	is	to	wonder	versus	believe.	Because	belief	is	
concerned	with	what	is	in	fact	the	case,	and	what	is	the	case	is	not	up	to	us,	we	cannot	
typically	believe	at	will.	By	the	same	token,	I	suggest,	because	perception	is	concerned	with	
what	is	actually	present	hic	et	nunc,	which	is	not	up	to	us,	we	cannot	typically	have	a	
perceptual	experience	as	of	x	at	will.	Thus	will-resistance	is	plausibly	a	symptom	of	the	
attitudinal	nature	of	perceptual	experience	(and	ditto	for	non-resistance	and	imaginative	
experience).	
																																																								
4	Thanks	to	Giulia	Martina	and	an	anonymous	AJP	referee	for	pressing	me	on	this	point	
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3.	The	Uniqueness	Challenge	
Some	writers	have	contested	the	notion	that	phenomenal	forceful(ness)	cleanly	separates	
perceptual	from	imaginative	experiences,	arguing	that	some	perceptual	experiences	lack	it	
(Ghijsen	2014)	or	that	some	imaginative	ones	have	it	(Teng	2018).	But	these	arguments	
often	rely	on	very	specific	interpretations	of	the	so-called	Perky	Effect	(Perky	1910):	when	
subjects	facing	a	screen	are	asked	to	imagine	a	banana,	while	unbeknownst	to	them	an	
ever-so-dim	image	of	a	banana	is	surreptitiously	projected	on	the	screen,	they	report	
having	imagined	a	banana,	not	having	perceived	a	banana.	Many	interpretations	of	this	are	
possible.	The	one	anti-dogmatists	rely	on	is	that	Perky	subjects	have	perceptual	
experiences	which	they	confuse	for	imaginings.	Such	confusion	is	only	possible,	they	claim,	
if	perceptual	experiences	do	not	have	a	phenomenal	force(fulness)	that	imaginative	
experiences	lack.	However,	the	experimental	results	proper	are	consistent	with	many	other	
interpretations.	It	is	worth	noting,	first	of	all,	that	Perky	included	very	little	of	his	subjects’	
actual	reports,	and	what	he	included	is	extremely	ambiguous	(see	for	yourself	–	Perky	
1910:	432).	In	any	event,	it	is	entirely	consistent	with	Perky’s	data	that	his	subjects	had	
both	perceptual	and	imaginative	banana	experiences,	the	latter	perhaps	primed	by	the	
former.		
Regardless	of	Perky,	though,	surely	subjects	sometimes	mistake	a	perceptual	for	an	
imaginative	experience.	This	might	be	taken	to	tell	against	the	idea	of	an	attitudinal	
phenomenology	of	perceptuality:	if	there	were	such	a	phenomenology,	it	might	be	argued,	
introspective	mistakes	of	this	sort	would	be	impossible.		
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In	this	form,	however,	the	objection	presupposes	that	introspection	–	at	least	of	
attitude-based	phenomenology	–	is	infallible.	But	it	is	quite	implausible	that	introspection	is	
infallible,	and	there	is	no	special	reason	to	think	attitude-based	phenomenology	should	be	
more	resistant	to	introspective	misrepresentation	than	content-based	phenomenology.	
Observe,	in	this	respect,	that	PD,	as	formulated	at	the	opening,	in	no	way	implies	that	
subjects	have	infallible	access	to	their	phenomenology.	This	is	just	as	it	should	be:	for	
phenomenal	dogmatism	to	wed	itself	to	introspective	infallibility	would	be	‘dialectically	
suicidal,’	given	the	low	acceptance	of	introspective	infallibility	among	contemporary	
epistemologists.	The	phenomenal	dogmatist	does	well	to	allow	that,	just	as	perception	
occasionally	misrepresents	the	subject’s	environment,	and	introspection	the	subject’s	
content-based	phenomenology,	so	introspective	misrepresentations	of	attitude-based	
phenomenology	should	occasionally	occur	–	including	misrepresentations	of	instances	of	
the	phenomenology	of	perceptuality.		
The	possibility	of	such	introspective	misrepresentation	does	force	a	dilemma	on	the	
phenomenal	dogmatist:	she	must	decide	whether	it	is	(a)	the	phenomenology	subjects	
actually	have	or	(b)	the	phenomenology	subjects	introspectively	take	themselves	to	have,	
that	provides	the	kind	of	immediate	justification	she	has	in	mind.	As	PD	reads,	it	is	(a)	that	
is	the	case.	We	could,	of	course,	formulate	a	thesis	that	makes	the	choice	of	(b)	instead.	But	I	
think	there	is	good	reason	to	stick	with	(a).	Even	if	introspection	sometimes	mistakes	a	
perceptual	for	an	imaginative	experience,	and	on	other	occasions	gets	things	right,	most	of	
the	time	there	is	no	introspective	uptake	at	all	–	we	just	‘live	through’	our	stream	of	
consciousness,	without	‘stepping	back’	to	introspectively	assess	it.	In	those	circumstances,	
(b)	would	deprive	the	subject	of	justification.	However,	the	intuitive	motivation	for	
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phenomenal	dogmatism,	as	seen	e.g.	in	(Dark	Room),	is	still	present.	So	what	generates	the	
antecedent	motivation	for	phenomenal	dogmatism	appears	to	track	(a),	not	(b).		
If	we	stick	with	(a)	–	hence	with	PD	as	is	–	it	means	that	subjects	who	have	a	
perceptual	experience	of	a	blue	chair,	but	introspectively	mistake	it	for	an	imaginative	
experience,	do	have	immediate	justification	for	believing	that	there	is	a	blue	chair	before	
them	–	though	they	are	unaware	of	having	this	justification;	and	subjects	who	
introspectively	mistake	an	imaginative	for	a	perceptual	experience	do	not	have	justification	
for	the	relevant	belief,	even	if	they	think	they	do.	This	should	not	be	surprising:	a	view	that	
grounds	a	certain	type	of	justification	in	phenomenology,	and	also	allows	for	introspective	
fallibility	regarding	phenomenology,	should	be	expected	to	allow	for	introspective	fallibility	
regarding	justification.5	
	 Even	if	we	grant	that	perception	and	imagination	differ	in	attitude-level	
phenomenology,	there	are	difficult	questions	surrounding	the	special	epistemic	oomph	
claimed	specifically	for	the	perceptual	attitude.	What	is	it	about	the	‘perception-ish’	
phenomenology	that	endows	it	with	epistemic	force	that	the	‘imagination-ish’	
phenomenology	lacks?	Phenomenal	dogmatists	must	explain	why	perceptual	experience’s	
distinctive	attitudinal	character	uniquely	poises	it	to	provide	the	immediate	justification	
that	it	provides.		
																																																								
5	On	certain	ways	of	drawing	the	internalism/externalism	divide	in	epistemology,	this	consequence	
might	deprive	phenomenal	dogmatism	of	its	status	as	an	internalist	view,	and	that	would	be	
surprising.	However,	insofar	as	the	only	way	for	phenomenal	dogmatism	to	block	this	consequence	
is	to	commit	to	introspective	infallibility	(at	least	regarding	attitude-based	phenomenology),	I	think	
the	wiser	choice	is	to	regard	the	internalist	status	as	negotiable	and	dependent	in	part	of	one’s	
conception	of	the	internalism/externalism	divide.	
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	 One	way	to	bring	out	the	difficulty	is	to	note	that	recollection	–	what	cognitive	
psychologists	call	‘episodic	memory’	–	also	represents-as-actual	its	object.	Can	you	recall	
the	last	time	you	saw	a	tiger	at	the	zoo?	When	you	recall	the	scene,	how	things	looked	and	
how	you	felt,	you	are	having	a	recollection	experience	–	an	episodic	memory.	This	kind	of	
recollection	experience,	like	perceptual	experience,	represents-as-actual	its	content.	(There	
are	also	differences,	as	we	will	see	momentarily,	but	what	I	want	to	highlight	now	is	an	
attitudinal	similarity	between	the	two.)	We	can	see	this	by	contrasting	recollecting	and	
imagining.	Suppose	Sam	proposes	to	Sasha,	only	to	be	awkwardly	spurned.	A	week	later,	
Sam	recalls	the	scene	in	anguish,	especially	the	moment	Sasha	said	no.	But	a	week	earlier,	
Sam	imagined	a	scene	that	happened	to	be	qualitatively	indistinguishable,	except	that	Sasha	
said	yes.	Up	to	the	‘yes’	or	‘no’	moment,	the	two	experiential	episodes	have	the	same	
content-level	phenomenology,	representing	the	same	sequence	of	events,	in	the	same	
settings,	with	the	same	vivacity,	etc.	Still	they	differ	in	this	respect:	the	recollection	frames	
the	events	as	having	really	happened,	whereas	the	imagination	does	not.	Thus	recollecting	
represents-as-actual	its	content.		
This	is	not	to	deny,	of	course,	an	attitude-level	phenomenal	difference	between	
perception	and	recollection.	Recall	Huemer’s	more	involved	gloss	on	forcefulness:	it	frames	
the	object	as	actually	present	here	and	now.	A	recollection	experience	need	not	frame	its	
object	as	here	and	certainly	does	not	frame	it	as	now.	On	the	contrary,	according	to	some	
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philosophers,	it	is	distinctive	of	recalling	that	it	frames	its	object	as	in	the	past	–	i.e.,	that	it	
represents-as-past	its	object	(Kriegel	2015a:	409).6		
We	might	say	that	the	perceptual	and	recollective	attitudes	resemble	in	their	
‘ontological	profile,’	along	which	they	differ	from	the	imaginative	attitude:	the	latter	
represents-as-possible	where	the	former	represent-as-actual.	At	the	same	time,	perceptual	
and	recollective	experiences	differ	in	their	‘temporal	profile,’	the	former	representing-as-
now,	the	latter	representing-as-past.	It	would	seem	that	just	as	there	are	dis/similarities	
between	experiences	along	various	dimensions	of	content,	there	are	also	dis/similarities	
between	them	along	different	dimensions	of	attitude.	
The	question	is	why	should	the	specific	profile	of	the	perceptual	attitude	uniquely	
poise	perception	to	justify	immediately.	What	is	it	about	a	perceptual	experience	of	a	blue	
chair	that	allows	only	it	to	provide	immediate	justification	for	a	blue-chair	belief?	Sure,	
perceptual	experience	exhibits	a	distinctive	overall	attitudinal	profile	that	no	other	type	of	
experience	exhibits.	But	different	aspects	or	dimensions	of	this	profile	it	may	share	with	
some	other	types	of	experience,	which	sport	their	own	distinctive	overall	attitudinal	
profiles.	What	is	so	special	about	the	perceptual	profile	that	invests	perception	with	the	
singular	epistemic	distinction	of	enabling	immediate	justification?	Call	this	the	Uniqueness	
Challenge	for	phenomenal	dogmatism.	
																																																								
6	I	am	assuming	here	that	the	pastness	information	is	‘attitudinally	encoded’	in	recollection	the	way	
the	‘now-ness’	information	is	in	perception.	One	recalls	seeing	a	tiger,	and	the	seeing	was	in	fact	in	
the	past,	but	it	is	not	part	of	what	one	recalls	that,	ah	yes,	the	experience	occurred	in	the	past.	For	a	
fuller	argument	for	this,	see	Kriegel	2015a.	
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I	want	to	be	clear	on	what	this	challenge	is	–	and	what	it	is	not.	It	is	not	the	challenge	
of	explaining	how	immediate	justification	is	possible	at	all,	nor	why	perceptual	experience	
can	provide	it.	All	this	is	taken	for	granted	by	the	time	we	are	joining	the	dialectic.	What	the	
Uniqueness	Challenge	asks	of	us	is	to	explain	why,	given	that	perceptual	phenomenology	
can	provide	immediate	justification,	other	types	of	phenomenology,	including	quite	similar	
ones,	cannot.	That	is,	it	is	the	challenge	of	explaining	why	perceptual	phenomenology	should	
be	unique	in	having	epistemic	oomph.		
	
4.	Extending	Phenomenal	Dogmatism	
The	phenomenal	dogmatist’s	best	response,	I	want	to	suggest,	is	to	say	that	there	is	nothing	
epistemically	special	about	perceptual	experience.	Instead,	perceptual,	recollective,	
imaginative,	and	perhaps	other	types	of	experience	immediately	justify	each	its	own	kind	of	
belief.	It	is	true	that	only	perceptual	experience	of	the	chair	immediately	justifies	the	belief	
that	there	is	a	chair	before	me.	But	recollective	experience	immediately	justifies	the	belief	
that	there	was	a	chair	before	me	and	imaginative	experience	immediately	justifies	the	belief	
that	there	could	be	a	chair	before	me.	Recollections	justify	beliefs	about	the	past	(‘historical	
beliefs’)	and	imaginations	beliefs	about	possibilities	(‘modal	beliefs’)	in	the	same	way	
perceptions	justify	beliefs	about	one’s	surroundings	(‘perceptual	beliefs’).7	
																																																								
7	I	indulge	here	the	Yablovian	view	of	imagination.	If	you	prefer	a	different	view,	the	point	would	be	
restated	in	terms	of	that	other	view	(e.g.,	if	imagination	frames	its	content	as	absent,	then	the	claim	
would	be	that	imaginative	experiences	immediately	justify	absence	beliefs).	
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In	each	case,	the	phenomenal	dogmatist	should	claim,	there	are	specific	kinds	of	
belief	that	are	eligible	for	immediate	justification	by	experience.	Which	beliefs	are	eligible	in	
which	case	is	determined	by	the	attitude-level	features	employed	in	each	type	of	
experience.	It	is	because	the	recollection	experience	represents-as-past	the	chair	that	it	
immediately	justifies	a	past-chair	belief;	it	is	because	perceptual	experience	represents-as-
present	that	it	justifies	a	present-chair	belief	(whether	we	read	‘present’	as	a	synonym	of	
‘now’	or	as	the	antonym	of	‘absent’);	and	it	is	because	imagination	represents-as-possible	
that	it	immediately	justifies	a	possible-chair	belief.	
The	above	remarks	suggest	a	general	way	in	which	an	experience	E,	perceptual	or	
otherwise,	may	immediately	justify	a	belief	B:	namely,	when	B’s	content	is	<x	is	F>	and	E	
represents-as-F	the	content	<x>.	Thus,	if	one	experience	represents-as-past	<x>,	and	
another	represents-as-now	<x>,	then	the	first	experience	immediately	justifies	a	belief	with	
the	content	<x	is	past>,	while	the	second	immediately	justifies	a	belief	with	the	content	<x	is	
now>.	The	idea	is	that	there	is	a	link	between	experiential	attitude	and	doxastic	content	that	
underwrites	experiences’	ability	to	immediately	justify	just	the	kinds	of	belief	they	do.	This	
link	ensures	that	for	every	experiential	attitude	A	there	is	a	corresponding	propositional	
content	C,	such	that	believing	C	would	be	immediately	(prima	facie)	justified	by	any	
experience	that	exhibits	A	toward	the	right	content.		
	 Now,	the	proposed	link	between	experiential	attitude	and	doxastic	content	supports	
phenomenal	dogmatism	only	where	representing-as-F	is	a	phenomenal	property.	
Otherwise,	all	the	link	supports	is	dogmatism	more	generically,	i.e.	the	idea	that	experience	
immediately	justifies	some	beliefs.	To	get	that	an	experience	immediately	justifies	beliefs	in	
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virtue	of	phenomenology,	its	representing-as-F	must	show	up	in	the	phenomenology.	As	we	
have	seen,	both	Pryor	and	Huemer	do	take	representing-as-F	to	be	a	phenomenal	property	
in	the	perceptual	case.	But	as	we	extend	phenomenal	dogmatism	beyond	perception,	we	
must	keep	in	mind	that	the	extension	is	restricted	to	those	experiences	that	phenomenally	
represent-as-F	their	contents.	It	is	of	course	possible	to	hold	that	no	attitudinal	property	is	
phenomenal	(as	‘pure	representationalists’	do).	But	many	philosophers	of	mind	do	take	
attitude	to	at	least	sometimes	show	up	in	the	phenomenology	(e.g.,	Cohen	1992,	Peacocke	
1998,	Horgan	and	Tienson	2002,	Kriegel	2015b,	Mitchell	2020).	
With	all	this	in	mind,	we	may	formulate	the	general	experiential	attitude/doxastic	
content	link	as	follows:		
(LINK)		When	a	subject	S	undergoes	an	experience	that	phenomenally	represents-as-F	
some	content	<x>,	S	thereby	has	immediate	prima	facie	epistemic	justification	for	
a	belief	with	the	content	<x	is	F>.	
Note	that	LINK	takes	no	stand	on	which	experiences	(if	any!)	phenomenally	represent-as-F	
some	content.	For	all	LINK	says,	immediate	justification	may	still	turn	out	to	be	the	
prerogative	of	perceptual	experience.	Nonetheless,	LINK	makes	possible	an	extension	of	
phenomenal	dogmatism	to	a	whole	range	of	non-perceptual	experiences	–	and	that	is	how	it	
helps	overcome	the	Uniqueness	Challenge.8	
																																																								
8	If	it	turns	out	that	perceptual	experiences	are	the	only	experiences	that	represent-as-F	
phenomenally,	then	perceptual	phenomenology	would	turn	out	to	have	a	singular	epistemic	oomph	
after	all.	Even	then,	though,	LINK	would	offer	us	a	reason	why	this	should	be	so,	thus	meeting	the	
Uniqueness	Challenge	sin	a	different	way.	
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	 It	may	be	useful	to	compare	LINK	with	Huemer’s	‘phenomenal	conservatism,’	which	
also	extends	immediate	justification	beyond	perception	–	to	all	states	of	‘seeming,’	including	
recollective,	intellectual,	and	introspective	seemings.	Huemer	(2001:	99)	formulates	
phenomenal	conservatism	thus:	
(PC)		 If	it	seems	to	S	that	p,	then	S	thereby	has	at	least	prima	facie	justification	for	
believing	that	p.	
Some	differences	between	PC	and	LINK	are	superficial.	Thus,	PC	is	framed	in	terms	of	
seemings,	LINK	in	terms	of	experiences;	but	Huemer	(2013	§2d)	does	hold	that	all	seemings	
are	experiences.	Other	differences,	however,	go	deeper.	In	particular,	note	that	in	PC	the	
contents	of	the	justifying	experience	and	the	belief	being	justified	are	identical;	whereas	in	
LINK	they	are	different,	as	some	of	the	information	showing	up	in	the	content	of	the	belief	is	
encoded	instead	in	the	experience’s	attitude.	This	seems	to	me	to	hold	a	double	advantage	
for	LINK.		
First,	LINK	allows	experiences	to	have	objectual	contents,	whereas	PC	is	forced	to	
construe	them	as	propositional,	since	the	content	of	the	belief	being	justified	will	always	be	
propositional.	It	is	not	clear	why	–	by	what	right,	so	to	speak	–	an	epistemological	thesis	
should	prejudge	an	open	issue	in	the	philosophy	of	mind.		
	 Secondly,	PC	faces	a	dilemma	regarding	where	to	fit	the	actually-present-here-and-
now	information.	If	the	experience	and	belief	have	the	same	content,	the	actually-present-
here-and-now	element	must	be	either	(a)	present	in	the	content	of	both	or	(b)	absent	from	
the	content	of	both.	But	both	options	are	highly	problematic.	Option	(a)	implies	that	in	an	
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olfactory	experience	of	freshly	brewed	coffee	now-ness	is	being	smelled	the	way	coffee	is	
smelled.	It	requires	actuality	to	be	a	visible	or	audible	quality	the	way	colors	and	sounds	
are.	Meanwhile,	option	(b)	assigns	the	wrong	truth	conditions	to	the	belief	being	justified.	
What	seems	to	be	immediately	justified	by	a	perceptual	experience	of	a	blue	chair	is	a	belief	
with	the	content	<a	blue	chair	is	actually	present	here	and	now>,	not	a	belief	with	a	content	
like	<a	blue	chair	exists>.	For	the	latter	could	be	made	true	by	a	blue	chair	on	the	moon,	and	
it	is	not	a	belief	that	could	be	made	true	by	lunar	chairs	that	your	earthly	perceptual	
experience	justifies	immediately.	Relatedly,	the	belief	that	a	blue	chair	exists	is	not	a	
perceptual	belief.	Perceptual	beliefs	are	precisely	beliefs	about	the	here	and	now.	But	
presumably	it	is	only	perceptual	beliefs	that	perceptual	experiences	can	justify	
immediately.	Thus	both	(a)	inserting	the	actually-present-here-and-now	element	into	the	
experiential	content	and	(b)	leaving	that	element	out	of	the	belief	content	lead	to	serious	
difficulties.	LINK	avoids	these	difficulties	by	keeping	that	information	out	of	the	experiential	
content	but	in	the	belief	content.	This	is	why	it	insists	the	two	contents	are	different.	
It	may	be	objected	that	content	identity	is	called	for	here,	since	the	belief	being	
justified	can	be	formed	by	‘taking	at	face	value’	the	corresponding	experience.	But	the	view	
that	the	content	of	the	experience	must	be	identical	to	the	content	of	the	belief	faces	
extraordinary	difficulties	in	handling	certain	problem	cases	(Silins	2011	§3).	Anyway,	
‘taking	at	face	value’	is	an	impressionistic	expression	that	can	be	understood	in	more	than	
one	way.	The	understanding	suggested	by	LINK	is	this:	to	take	an	experience	at	face	value	is	
to	form,	on	the	basis	of	that	experience,	a	belief	that	conveys	the	same	information,	but	
where	some	information	encoded	in	the	experience’s	attitude	is	carried	explicitly	in	the	
belief’s	content.	It	is	to	perform	a	cognitive	act	that	effects	a	certain	informational	
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reorganization,	whereby	some	information	‘migrates’	from	attitude	to	content	(cf.	Recanati	
2007	Part	2).		
	
5.	Three	Versions	
What	I	am	recommending	to	the	phenomenal	dogmatist	is	conjoining	LINK	to	PD,	thus	
avoiding	the	charge	of	arbitrarily	singling	out	perception	for	special	epistemic	significance.	
It	is	worth	distinguishing,	however,	three	versions	of	this	kind	of	LINK-enriched	PD.		
	 Consider	that	many	philosophers	hold	that	beliefs	themselves	can	be	conscious	
experiences,	exemplifying	‘proprietary	cognitive	phenomenology.’	Suppose	that	part	of	
what	it	is	for	conscious	beliefs	to	constitute	cognitive	experiences	is	for	them	to	
(phenomenally)	represent-as-true	their	contents	(see	Cohen	1992:	11,	Kriegel	2015b:	65-
6).	Then	by	LINK’s	lights,	a	conscious	belief/cognitive	experience	with	the	content	<p>	
should	provide	immediate	justification	for	a	belief	with	the	content	<p	is	true>.	But	this	is	
highly	counterintuitive.	Suppose	that	S’s	conscious	belief	that	p	is	completely	unjustified,	
the	result	of	wishful	thinking	and	superstition	entirely.	Then	presumably	S’s	belief	that	p	
does	not	justify	S	in	believing	<p	is	true>.	But	even	if	a	conscious	belief	that	p	is	justified,	say	
because	correctly	deduced	from	justified	beliefs	that	q	and	that	if	q	then	p,	one’s	
justification	for	believing	<p	is	true>	would	depend	in	part	on	the	justification	for	believing	
<q>	and	<if	q	then	p>	–	and	thus	would	not	be	immediate	justification.	
	 There	are	three	possible	responses	to	this,	each	defining	a	different	version	of	LINK-
enriched	phenomenal	dogmatism.	The	first	is	to	deny	the	existence	of	cognitive	
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phenomenology,	or	at	least	the	kind	of	attitudinal	cognitive	phenomenology	that	could	plug	
into	LINK.	More	generally,	the	strategy	here	is	to	reject	any	attitudinal	phenomenology	
whose	existence	would	produce	counterintuitive	results	when	plugged	into	LINK.		
	 The	second	option	is	to	bite	the	bullet	and	accept	that	a	cognitive	experience	that	
phenomenally	represents-as-true	<p>	provides	immediate	justification	for	believing	that	p	
is	true,	while	insisting	that	this	justification	is	merely	prima	facie,	defeasible	justification.	
With	a	cognitive	experience	produced	by	wishful	thinking	and	superstition,	its	problematic	
etiology	constitutes	a(n	undercutting)	defeater	of	the	very	real	but	defeasible	justification	
that	the	cognitive	experience	provides	for	believing	<p	is	true>.	It	is	admittedly	unintuitive	
that	simply	being	visited	by	a	certain	cognitive	phenomenology	could	justify	one	in	
believing	that	p	is	true.	But	it	is	after	all	the	starting	point	of	phenomenal	dogmatism	that	
simply	having	a	certain	kind	of	experience	generates	justification	(a	starting	point	which,	
recall,	lies	dialectically	upstream	from	this	paper’s	concerns).	Since	a	phenomenal	
dogmatist	accepts	that	being	visited	by	a	perceptual	phenomenology	that	represents-as-
present	<x>	generates	prima	facie,	defeasible	justification	for	believing	<x	is	present>,	she	
should	not	feel	overly	embarrassed	by	the	notion	that	being	visited	by	a	cognitive	
phenomenology	that	represents-as-true	<p>	generates	prima	facie,	defeasible	justification	
for	believing	<p	is	true>.	Whether	the	belief	is	ultima	facie,	all-things-considered	justified	
would	depend	also	on	various	other	factors,	including	the	epistemic	credentials	of	the	
cognitive	experience	that	prima	facie	justifies	it.	
	 A	third	option	is	to	require	that	whenever	an	experience	immediately	justifies	a	
belief,	it	must	be	able	to	do	so	independently	of	anything	justifying	it.	For	otherwise	the	
	
26 
justification	for	the	belief	would	not	come	entirely	from	this	experience,	but	partly	from	
whatever	justifies	it.	Accordingly,	LINK	must	be	restricted	to	experiences	that	do	not	need	to	
be	justified	by	anything	else.	Contemporary	phenomenal	dogmatists	often	hold	that	
perceptual	experiences	are	not	assessable	for	justification	in	the	first	place	(Pryor	2005:	
210).	In	some	versions	of	classical	foundationalism,	certain	experiences	were	claimed	to	be	
somehow	self-justifying.	Either	way,	such	experiences	would	be	‘justification-autonomous’:	
they	would	not	need	to	be	justified	by	anything	outside	themselves,	so	to	speak.	The	
suggestion	under	consideration	is	to	reformulate	LINK	so	it	applies	only	to	justification-
autonomous	experiences.9		
	 It	is	not	our	purpose	here	to	take	a	stand	on	which	option	is	best	–	they	all	constitute	
versions	of	PD	that	meet	the	Uniqueness	Challenge.	Personally,	I	like	the	first	version	least:	
tailoring	one’s	phenomenology	to	fit	one’s	epistemology	seems	like	the	wrong	direction	of	
theorizing.	And	I	find	myself	slightly	more	sympathetic	to	the	second	version	than	the	third,	
as	it	underwrites	a	more	unified	account	of	phenomenal	justification	as	such.	But	I	proffer	
these	here	as	autobiographical	remarks.	
	
6.	Global	Phenomenal	Dogmatism		
Call	the	conjunction	of	PD	and	LINK	global	phenomenal	dogmatism	(GPD).	I	have	argued	that	
GPD	meets	the	Uniqueness	Challenge:	given	LINK,	perception	is	not	arbitrarily	singled	out	
																																																								
9	The	restricted	principle	might	read	as	follows:	If	S	undergoes	an	experience	that	(i)	phenomenally	
represents-as-F	some	content	<x>	and	(ii)	is	justification-autonomous,	then	S	has	immediate	prima	
facie	epistemic	justification	for	a	belief	with	the	content	<x	is	F>.	
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for	unparalleled	epistemic	significance.	On	the	contrary,	every	experience	that	employs	a	
distinctive	attitude-level	phenomenology,	whereby	it	phenomenally	represents-as-F	some	
content,	immediately	justifies	a	corresponding	kind	of	belief.		
	 Dogmatists	often	claim	that	the	best	way	to	motivate	dogmatism	is	to	simply	reflect	
on	everyday	examples	(Pryor	2000:	206).	If	someone	asks	‘How	do	you	know	Charles	is	in	
the	room?	What	makes	you	so	sure?,’	the	answer	‘I	am	looking	right	at	him!’	would	not	be	
out	of	place.	Intuitively,	having	a	perceptual	experience	of	Charles	is	about	as	good	a	reason	
as	anyone	can	reasonably	expect	for	believing	that	Charles	is	present.	But	notice,	now,	that	
if	someone	asks	‘How	do	you	know	Chalmers	gave	the	colloquium	talk	yesterday?	What	
makes	you	so	sure?,’	the	answer	‘I	remember	it	very	clearly!’	is	just	as	natural.	And	if	you	
ask	yourself	whether	it	would	be	possible	to	fit	the	desk	through	the	door,	it	is	natural	to	
imagine	trying	to	fit	it	through.	If	your	imagination	presents	it	as	fitting	through	
comfortably,	then	intuitively	you	are	justified	in	believing	that	it	is	possible	to	get	the	desk	
through	the	door.	Thus	extending	dogmatism	beyond	the	perceptual	domain	flows	nicely	
with	the	intuitive	motivation	for	perceptual	dogmatism.10	
In	this	picture,	there	is	an	elegant	division	of	epistemic	labor	between	experience’s	
content	and	attitude.	The	attitude	selects	the	kind	of	belief	that	is	eligible	for	phenomenal	
justification.	The	experience’s	content	then	determines	which	belief	of	the	relevant	kind	
would	in	fact	be	justified	by	the	experience.	It	is	because	the	perceptual	experience	of	a	blue	
chair	is	a	perceptual	experience	(rather	than,	say,	a	recollective	experience)	that	the	kind	of	
beliefs	it	can	immediately	justify	are	perceptual	(rather	than	historical);	but	it	is	because	it	
																																																								
10	Thanks	to	Anna	Giustina	for	pointing	this	out	to	me.	
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is	an	experience	of	a	blue	chair	(rather	than,	say,	of	a	green	table)	that	the	specific	
perceptual	belief	it	immediately	justifies	is	a	blue-chair	(rather	than	green-table)	belief.	
Likewise,	it	is	because	imagining	a	flying	pig	represents	a	flying	pig	(content	aspect)	that	
the	specific	modal	belief	it	justifies	is	that	a	flying	pig	is	possible;	but	it	is	because	it	
represents-as-possible	(attitude	aspect)	that	the	kind	of	belief	it	justifies	is	a	modal	belief.	
Global	phenomenal	dogmatism	thus	has	several	appealing	features.	It	neutralizes	
concerns	about	the	arbitrarily	special	status	of	perceptual	phenomenology.	It	is	motivated	
by	the	same	kind	of	reflection	on	everyday	cases	that	motivated	perceptual	dogmatism	
originally.	It	explains	why	attitude	plays	an	important	epistemic	role	in	phenomenal	
justification.	It	makes	phenomenal	dogmatism	consistent	with	perceptual	experiences	
being	sometimes	objectual	rather	than	propositional.	And	it	offers	an	elegantly	unified	and	
principled	understanding	of	phenomenal	justification	in	general,	as	grounded	in	a	single	
structural	principle	linking	experiential	attitude	and	doxastic	content	–	LINK.	
A	last	virtue	worth	noting	is	that	LINK	offers	us	a	concrete	way	to	move	forward	in	
various	recent	debates	about	the	extent	of	immediate	justification.	Consider	for	example	the	
idea,	increasingly	prominent	in	the	philosophy	of	emotion,	that	emotional	experiences	
justify	evaluative	beliefs	in	somewhat	the	same	way	perceptual	experiences	justify	
perceptual	beliefs	(Döring	2007).	On	this	view,	my	fear	of	the	loose	snake	provides	me	with	
immediate	(prima	facie)	justification	for	believing	that	the	snake	is	dangerous	to	me,	my	
indignation	at	the	plight	of	the	Kurds	gives	me	immediate	justification	for	believing	that	the	
plight	of	the	Kurds	is	unjust,	and	so	on.	How	should	we	evaluate	this	claim?	Against	the	
background	of	LINK,	it	would	have	to	be	the	case	that	emotional	experiences	feature	the	
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right	attitude-level	phenomenology.11	If,	for	instance,	fear	experiences	phenomenally	
represent-as-dangerous	their	objects	(e.g.,	snakes),	then	by	LINK’s	lights,	fear	experiences	
provide	immediate	justification	for	danger	beliefs;	if	indignation	phenomenally	represents-
as-unjust	its	object,	then	indignation	provides	immediate	justification	for	injustice	beliefs;	
and	so	on.	
Similar	debates	surround	intuition	experiences	(whether	they	immediately	justify	
certain	a	priori	beliefs),	introspective	experiences	(whether	they	immediately	justify	certain	
psychological	beliefs),	etc.	(Huemer	2007,	Chudnoff	2012).	If	LINK	is	right,	the	way	to	
evaluate	such	claims	is	to	consider	whether	intuitional	and/or	introspective	experiences	
have	the	right	attitude-level	phenomenology.	Thus	LINK	offers	us	a	way	to	move	forward	the	
discussion	in	a	whole	range	of	important	debates.		
In	conclusion,	there	is	much	to	recommend	incorporating	LINK	into	phenomenal	
dogmatism.	What	I	mean	by	this	is	mostly	this:	there	are	reasons	for	the	phenomenal	
dogmatist	to	adopt	LINK.	Anti-dogmatists	are	not	going	to	warm	up	to	dogmatism	just	
because	it	is	willing	to	go	global;	and	if	they	oppose	dogmatism	because	of	Bayesian,	
Sellarsian,	or	cognitive-penetration-type	worries,	nothing	about	the	incorporation	of	LINK	
would	speak	to	their	concerns.	However,	those	who	find	some	antecedent	merit	in	
phenomenal	dogmatism,	but	worry	about	an	inexplicably	special	status	granted	to	
perceptual	phenomenology	in	it,	should	find	a	LINK-enriched	dogmatism	appealing.	At	the	
very	least,	the	resulting	global	phenomenal	dogmatism	offers	an	elegantly	unified	account	
																																																								
11	Note,	though,	that	if	one	restricts	LINK	to	justification-autonomous	experiences,	it	would	also	
have	to	be	the	case	that	emotional	experiences	are	justification-autonomous.	
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of	the	epistemic	connection	between	experience	and	belief,	as	grounded	in	a	single	
underlying	structural	principle	linking	experiential	attitude	and	doxastic	content.12	
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